TO RAISE A FALLEN PEOPLE

To Raise a Fallen People

HOW NINETEENTH-CENTURY INDIANS SAW
THEIR WORLD AND SHAPED OURS

Edited by Rahul Sagar

juggernaut

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For Mia and Sophie

Peoples always feel the effects of their origins. The circumstances that accompanied their birth and served to develop them influence the entire course of the rest of their lives. If it were possible for us to go back to the origins of societies and to examine the first monuments of their history, I doubt not that we could discover in them the first cause of prejudices, habits, dominant passions, of all that finally composes what is called national character. . . . Thus would be explained the destiny of certain peoples that an unknown force seems to carry them along toward. . . . But until now the facts have been wanting for such study; the spirit of analysis has come to nations only as they aged, and when at last they thought of contemplating their cradle, time had already enveloped it in a cloud, ignorance and pride had surrounded it with fables behind which the truth lies hidden.

—ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, *DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA*, 1.1.2

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PREFACE

This volume has been nearly two decades in the making. Its origin lies in the curious vitality that India began to exhibit toward the close of the twentieth century. A remarkable series of events—the liberalization of the economy, the development of nuclear weapons, the forging of new diplomatic relationships, the embrace of globalization—appeared to herald a revolution. The renunciatory ideals of recent decades were being displaced, observers declared, by a more pragmatic worldview. But, before long, the very same observers were expressing frustration at signs of continued inwardness and apathy. From this uneven experience arose a question of some importance: Should we expect a rising India to behave as great powers do—by concertedly developing its capabilities and advancing its national interests—or not? Seeking to understand the sources of India's conduct, I set out to investigate what role Indians thought their country should play on the world stage.

How to conduct such an investigation was not obvious. Whom exactly to study? In which time period? What documents to examine? Little had been published on the role of ideas since Bimal Prasad's pioneering *The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy*, which appeared in 1962. Archives seemed the natural starting point. But government documents on "grand strategy" were classified, and I was told, more than once, that debate on this subject was conducted in person and not on paper. Therefore, I began

interviewing bureaucrats and ministers with a view to identifying ideas important to them. But busy officials and wary retirees were not always willing or able to speak candidly. Those who did volunteer their views struggled to elaborate them at length. The generalities they voiced suggested that they were influenced not by some precise doctrine but by ideas in the wider milieu. Hence, I began trying to discern broad intellectual currents in public life. This was not a straightforward process either. I searched for polls or surveys, but sources like these were hard to come by at the time. The little data available was unreliable and topical rather than conceptual. It did not, therefore, illuminate the ideas informing public attitudes.

At an impasse, I discussed the matter with J. N. Dixit, the cerebral former foreign secretary (and later national security advisor). He suggested examining what leading figures immediately before and after Independence had said about international politics (which later became the subject of his *Makers of India's Foreign Policy*, a valuable collection of short biographies). I was reassured by his stress on the impact that ideas had had on decision-makers, but felt unsure about focusing on a few prominent figures, especially those from the Congress era. The churning unleashed by the "million mutinies" underway suggested that India's future political leadership would emerge from new and varied segments of society. A close study of the *grandees* of recent decades would shed light on their doings, but it would not illuminate what had come before or what was to come after.

Still mulling over the problem, I spoke with Jairam Ramesh, then in his avatar as a celebrated technocrat. A voracious reader, he happened to be in the middle of Walter Russell Mead's *Special Providence*, which outlined the competing "traditions"—Hamiltonian, Jeffersonian, Jacksonian, and Wilsonian—that had shaped American foreign policy. Why not do something similar in the Indian context, he suggested. I found the proposition appealing, but I was not persuaded by the "personification" of ideals because leaders typically only channel streams of thought that long precede them. As I searched for a way to trace these broader currents, Kanti Bajpai published his groundbreaking essay "India's Strategic Culture," which outlined the "schools of thought" he saw as shaping Indian conduct. Inspired by Bajpai's example, but differing from him on the characterization of the dominant ideals of the era, I eventually wrote my first essay on the subject, "State of Mind: What Kind of Power Will India Be?"

Often when preparing a publication, one learns how much one does *not* know. By the time my first essay was complete in 2008, I felt I had made an error in focusing solely on the post-Independence period. In effect, I had assumed that Indians only began thinking about international politics after 1947. This was in line with the prevailing view, voiced by George Tanham in his influential *Indian Strategic Thought*, and seconded by colossuses like K. Subrahmanyam and Jaswant Singh, that there was "little evidence" that Indians had previously "thought coherently and systematically about national strategy." As Subrahmanyam observed in *Shedding Shibboleths*, "When Tanham put forward his thesis in a seminar . . . in Delhi in February 1994 to an audience comprising a large number of retired defence and civilian officials and academics, the majority contested his thesis. 'Did not India have Chanakya as a strategic thinker?,' they asked. True indeed, but Chanakya lived some twenty-three centuries ago. What of the centuries after him?"

Contrary to Tanham, I was already starting to see signs that we would find, buried in the archives, many rich debates about international relations. I soon had a chance to make my case. In 2010, Kanti Bajpai invited me to a landmark conference, "Grand Strategic Thought." I presented there an essay detailing the hitherto-ignored corpus produced by Hindu nationalists in the early twentieth century. The reaction from the audience was all the encouragement I needed. A sabbatical at the National University of Singapore's Asia Research Institute (ARI) in 2011, for which I am indebted to Prasenjit Duara, allowed me to polish the essay (subsequently published as "'Jiski Lathi, Uski Bhains': The Hindu Nationalist View of International Politics"). It also gave me the chance to prepare an overview of the materials I had found (later published as "Before Midnight: Views on International Relations, 1857–1947").

After these essays started circulating, Devesh Kapur, that selfless mentor to generations of scholars, invited me to participate in a grant application to the Smith Richardson Foundation. Thanks to Allan Song, who saw merit in the proposal, the grant was approved and I could begin truly plumbing the archives. Initially, I focused on locating books. The going was slow because these materials were widely dispersed and oftentimes missing. Still, encouraged by Kanti Bajpai and C. Raja Mohan, I kept up the slog. Then, following a thought-provoking conversation with Pratap

Bhanu Mehta, I began to search more widely, trawling through periodicals and newspapers. I soon realized that owing to the costliness of printing and circulating books, the great bulk of public debate in colonial India had actually occurred in these periodicals and newspapers, which contained hundreds of essays, reports, and book reviews on international politics. This literature showed that, far from being mute subjects as Tanham had been led to believe, colonial-era Indians had given international relations much thought. In particular, when confronted with great power politics, they had reacted unevenly, with some embracing it and others fiercely decrying it. This history shed invaluable light on the question I had set out to investigate. It suggested that India's unsteady conduct does not stem from pragmatism being a new or inchoate phenomenon. Rather, it reflects lingering disagreement over the relevance and appeal of great power politics.

What remained was to thoroughly excavate the materials I had discovered. But there was a significant challenge: the periodicals in question were scattered around the globe, making them difficult and expensive to collect. Then I had another stroke of luck. In 2013 I moved to the National University of Singapore (NUS). The leaders of three institutions there were persuaded of the importance of what I had found and extended invaluable support: Kishore Mahbubani at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, Pericles Lewis at Yale-NUS College, and Tan Tai Yong at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS). As a consequence, I was able to build a team of research assistants to help me collect these far-flung periodicals. Subsequently, in 2015 I was recruited to NYU Abu Dhabi, where Hervé Crès, the dean of Social Sciences, and Fabio Piano, the provost, did everything possible to help me cross the finishing line. This volume is a direct outcome of the immense support they provided. I do not have words enough to thank them for their faith in my research.

So far, I have detailed the individuals and institutions that made this book possible. Along the way I also benefited greatly from colleagues that invited me to present the material in this volume or made illuminating observations on the themes developed in it. They include C. Raja Mohan, Ashley Tellis, Milan Vaishnav, and Constantino Xavier at Carnegie Endowment; Nicolas Blarel at Leiden University, Sunil Khilnani at SAIS, Johns Hopkins University; Rajesh Basrur, Sumitha Kutty, Anit Mukherjee, and

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For the publication of this volume, I am deeply grateful to my marvelous editors at Juggernaut: Keshava Guha, Nandini Mehta, and Chiki Sarkar. They responded warmly to my proposal, improved the manuscript in countless ways, and patiently shepherded the book through the production process. My thanks also to Sravya Darbhamulla and Arunava Sinha for enriching the volume with their elegant translations, to Sebastian Ballard for the helpful map, and to Gavin Morris for the gorgeous cover. I am very grateful to the Sandeep & Gitanjali Maini Foundation for kindly permitting me to use Raja Ravi Varma's inspiring *Varaha Avatar*, and I am truly indebted to Archana Shenoy and Manu Pillai for their kind help in obtaining this permission. These invaluable additions to the manuscript were made possible by generous support from NYU Abu Dhabi Grants for Publication Program. I am especially indebted to Meghna Basu, Christian Fastenrath, Sanchi Rai, Khushi Singh Rathore, and Nidhi Shukla. I would not have been able to complete the manuscript without their invaluable, untiring, and good-natured research assistance. This manuscript was brought to a close during my Global Network University Fellowship at NYU Shanghai. For this unique opportunity, and for their warmth and support, I am very grateful to Joanna Waley-Cohen, Maria Montoya, and Zvi Ben-Dor Benite. My greatest debts are to colleagues who have urged

this manuscript along, even when they have not always agreed with the conclusions I have drawn: Kanti Bajpai, Hervé Crès, Devesh Kapur, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, C. Raja Mohan, and especially Anit Mukherjee and Rohan Mukherjee, who have soldiered through more drafts than they would like to remember.

Finally, on a personal note, I want to thank my family, Jyoti, Prema, Una, Simran, Isabella, and Kitty, for their love and support, without which I would have little to show for myself. Above all else, I am grateful to my daughters, Mia and Sophie, for their love, joyfulness, and brilliance. I cherish them more than words can say, and I thank them for making my life utterly happy and complete. I dedicate this work to them: may they be bridges; may they cross divides and advance international understanding.

August 15, 2021

EDITORIAL NOTE

The original essays have been edited for length. Deletions are indicated by ellipses. Spellings have been modernized where possible. Insertions are marked with square brackets.

TO RAISE A FALLEN PEOPLE


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Cairns
Fiji
Sydney
Melbourne
To Liverpool
New York
To Southampton
Jamaica
St. Lucia
St. Vincent
Barbados
Grenada
Guyana
Trinidad
Surinam
Russian advance toward India
Emigrant destination
Typical shipping route
Typical telegraph route
Opium route
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INTRODUCTION

As its economic power, military strength, and cultural influence expands, India is becoming an ever more important actor on the world stage. The course of world events is also deepening its significance. China's extraordinary rise has prompted discussion in the West about whether it can employ India as a counterweight.[1] Consequently, there is growing interest in understanding Indian worldviews.[2] In particular, what do its decision-makers consider the nature of international relations to be, and what role do they think India ought to play in it?

When it comes to charting contemporary views, we are spoiled for choice. A slew of excellent books by officials[3] and scholars[4] have shed much light on India's foreign relations and the personalities[5] at the helm. Drawing on personal experience, public records, and private papers, these books have greatly advanced our understanding of Indian foreign relations since 1947.[6] Far less has been written, however, about ideas and debates on foreign relations that occurred *before* 1947.[7] This lacuna deserves to be rectified. As important as it is to study what leaders and citizens say and do today, we ought to also attend to what they have thought in the past. This is because a political community is informed by the ideals it inherits; its trials and tribulations create memories and sentiments that "can be inhibiting as well as inspiring."[8] These memories and sentiments fade or ferment quietly in

recesses, and then forcefully reemerge when circumstances change.[9] It is important, therefore, to step back from contemporary personalities and current events and to search for deep sources of conduct—the "national ideas" that serve as "building blocks of international life."[10]

Until recently, there was some doubt as to whether Indians have thought about international relations in a "systematic and sustained way."[11] A number of observers worried that culture, geography, and history had fostered a lack of interest in foreign relations and thereby led to a culture of ad hoc policymaking.[12] These fears were put to rest by pioneering scholarship outlining the worldviews held by India's political and bureaucratic elites.[13] The doctrines of nonviolence and nonalignment championed by Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru received particular attention in this regard. But barely had commentators begun to map the terrain than Indian decision-makers started distancing themselves from the renunciatory ideals associated with their predecessors. Decisions to openly develop nuclear weapons, invite foreign investment, and forge strategic partnerships, especially with the United States and Israel, constituted notable departures from previous ideological commitments.[14]

Thus arose the question that observers continue to debate today: Is India's incipient pragmatism a new, perhaps fragile, impulse, or is it the expression of deeper, more durable, beliefs? Put another way, we want to know whether India will henceforth behave like a traditional great power by concertedly developing its capabilities and advancing its national interests. A number of commentators answer this question in the affirmative. Pragmatism, they argue, is far from new or unusual in the Indian context: it is entirely in keeping with deep-seated civilizational beliefs about the nature and purpose of politics. As evidence, they cite texts and examples from when kingdoms in the Indian subcontinent commanded great power and influence, including classical treatises like the *Brihaspati Sutra*, *Manu Smriti*, *Arthashastra*, *Tirukkural*, *Agni Purana*, and *Nitisara*; literary wonders like the *Mahabharata* and the *Hitopadesa*; the examples set by ancient empires, especially the Mauryas and Cholas; and the medieval and early modern empires of the Pandyas, Vijayanagara, the Mughals, the Sikhs, and the Marathas.[15]

This revival of interest in ancient and early modern Indian statecraft is a welcome development. But can these striking examples truly be the source of contemporary conduct? Such a claim can be challenged on two fronts. First, the further back in history we delve, the more uncertain

becomes the contemporary relevance of what we find. Present-day political institutions, moral values, social order, technological abilities, and economic engagements are entirely unlike those of the ancient Mauryans or even the early modern Marathas. This makes it difficult to draw anything like a straight line from their ideals to the current era. Second, if contemporary India is in fact deeply shaped by a centuries-old tradition of political realism, then there ought to be broad agreement on the ruthless nature of international politics and a corresponding willingness to do what is necessary. In practice, however, contemporary India openly neglects policies that would allow it to marshal resources and compete more effectively in the international sphere. Neither changes in political leadership nor institutional reform, despairing observers note, seem to make much of a difference.[16] Such widespread apathy cannot be an inheritance from the empire-building Mauryas or Marathas, surely.

Here then is the puzzle we confront when we search for the deeper sources of Indian conduct: the ideals of the *recent* past cannot explain the pragmatism of the present day; the ideals of the *distant* past cannot explain the half-heartedness of the present day. This puzzle seems to favor the skeptical opinion that Indian worldviews boil down to little more than "cautious prudence"—a "predominantly defensive" stance that does not spring from any sustained reflection on the nature of international relations.[17] But there is another possibility: What if scholars and commentators have not searched in the right place?

To Raise a Fallen People shows that India's perplexing behavior can be deciphered by changing *where* we look for evidence. If we want to understand how the past influences the present, then we need a fuller account of *modern* India's intellectual history. This history commenced in the *nineteenth century* when divided or distant communities came to see themselves as members of an overarching nation. This was the period when educated and capable public figures sought to influence colonial authorities as well as their compatriots through argumentation rather than agitation. The political forces these elites birthed became central in the post-Independence period. This makes what they previously read and wrote about international politics of continuing relevance to those seeking to understand contemporary India.

Upon first glance there would appear to be no evidence that nineteenth-century India bore witness to insightful debate on foreign relations. Only one book, the venerable *Sources of Indian Tradition*, has marshaled some

of the available materials.[18] However, as its focus is on domestic politics, the extracts it contains touch on international politics only in passing. To compound matters, these extracts come from figures separated by decades, making it hard to discern something like sustained national conversations on foreign relations. Given such fragmentary evidence, scholars have naturally assumed that the nineteenth century was the era of domestic awakening, and that concerted engagement with international politics really only began a little before 1947.

To Raise a Fallen People overturns this conventional wisdom. It does so by drawing attention to the English-language literature that emerged and flourished in the nineteenth century, principally in the form of periodicals.[19] Though some of these periodicals have been used to good effect by historians, they have been overlooked by scholars of India's foreign relations. This owes, no doubt, to the wide dispersal of these periodicals and the woeful condition of libraries and archives in India. At any rate, the oversight deserves to be rectified. The emergence of English as the lingua franca and the growth of the post and the rail, which made long-distance communication viable, helped newspapers and periodicals do for India what the café did for Europe and the town hall did for America. In these fora, public figures developed and debated ideals that shaped India's subsequent trajectory. Thus, if we want to comprehend enduring patterns in Indian thinking about international politics, it is essential to examine what was said in the nineteenth century—the Age of the Page. By virtue of a decade of archival research, *To Raise a Fallen People* provides the bird's-eye view that we have thus far been lacking. It contains essays that permit us to rise above eccentric personalities and singular events and to instead witness broader national conversations on international politics.

Inevitably, only a very limited selection can be presented here. The interested reader will find a much larger sample in the section entitled "Further Reading" and in a new online archive.[20] And there is still more to be done. The focus on English-language sources means that we have before us the views of the metropolitan elite, especially of "eminent" Indians, as they were termed at the time. This focus is not unreasonable, seeing as this class of persons had, through the press and the dais, extraordinary and enduring influence on their compatriots' understanding of world events. But a still-wider sample, drawing on regional languages, will greatly deepen

our knowledge of the ideas circulating in this era. Hopefully, scholars with relevant linguistic abilities will take up this challenge.[21] Regrettably, the archives revealed relatively little in the way of English-language publications on international (as opposed to domestic) politics by marginalized groups such as women and Dalits.[22] These perspectives appear in far greater numbers after the turn of the century, when increased access to education expanded the public sphere, and opportunities for travel as well as the upheaval produced by the Great War stimulated wider discussion on international questions. A forthcoming sequel to this volume that focuses on the first half of the twentieth century will incorporate and shed light on these valuable viewpoints.

So, what do the essays unearthed here show? Arguably, they reveal the foundations of India's half-hearted approach to great power politics. The pragmatism of India's metropolitan elite comes to life in chapters 1, 2, and 8, which trace historic debates on the necessity of pursuing modern education, traveling overseas, and adopting Western norms. The essays challenge narratives that depict Indians as powerless colonial subjects. For example, critics of colonialism depict the arrival of English education in India as an imposition founded on disdain for indigenous culture. They often angrily cite Thomas Babington Macaulay's remark that "a single shelf of a good European library was worth the whole native literature of India."[23] But Macaulay's bluster does not explain why *Indians* hastened to study English. *They* eagerly sought modern education because they realized that modern knowledge holds the key to power. Consider what Madhava Rao, who would go on to become a celebrated "native" statesman, had to say to his compatriots in 1846. Only by learning European arts and sciences, he urged, could they hope "to raise a fallen people high in the scale of nations."[24] There was no reason to shy away from the demands of the age. To the contrary, a true patriot would encourage the acquisition of Western knowledge because

> When once these advantages will be attained, the Hindoos will not rest satisfied with a mere perusal of the English works of science and literature; they will not rest contented with treading a beaten path; but now and then some towering genius may rise, and exploring some unknown track, make discoveries which may not fall short of those of Watt, or Newton, or any other illustrious ornament that English annals can boast of.[25]

At the same time, chapters 3 to 7 trace the growing disillusionment of India's metropolitan elite when England repeatedly betrayed the liberal ideals it publicly professed. This unhappiness opened the door to the reactionary ideas and movements, detailed in chapter 9, that gained influence in the closing decades of the nineteenth century. Prior to this moment, Indians had thought it incumbent upon rulers to preserve society from threats; their ancient treatises on statecraft warned them that international politics was governed by *matsya-nyaya*, or the "law of fishes," where the strong feed on the weak.[26] But in the final quarter of the nineteenth century, a contrary idea—that international politics was sordid and self-destructive—gained currency. This abrupt change owed much to European scholars of Indian civilization. Seeking to justify their arcane scholarship to European audiences that had an increasingly dim view of the peoples they ruled over, these "Orientalists" insisted that "materialist" Europe had much to learn from India's "spiritual" civilization. This endorsement thrilled Hindu revivalists in India, who employed it to balm their compatriots' wounded pride. And so, by the close of the century, it became routine to hear, as the crusading Theosophist Annie Besant declared in Calcutta's Town Hall in 1894: "Let lesser nations and lesser men fight for conquest, for place and for power; these gimcracks are toys for children, and the children should be left to quarrel over them. . . . In India's hand is laid the sacred charge of keeping alight the torch of spirit amid the fogs and storms of increasing materialism."[27]

Championed by charismatic figures and religious societies, the notion that "spiritual greatness" was India's "mission" became commonplace in the following decades. Thus, we find Gandhi depicting nonviolence as the quintessential Indian value, Rabindranath Tagore proclaiming India the embodiment of humanity, and Nehru promising that India would forge a new order characterized by peaceful coexistence. Though bitter experience has diminished the appeal of these ideals, they remain a potent force in contemporary India, taking the form of pacifism on the Left and spiritualism on the Right. A clearer sense of the origin of these ideals may help us understand their longevity. Born out of "the inflamed desire of the insufficiently regarded to count for something among the cultures of the world,"[28] these ideals are likely to remain alive so long as Indians feel the need to prove that they are morally superior to those more powerful than themselves.

Another insight from the essays in this volume is that many present-day controversies over foreign policy have a longer history than is commonly realized. Consider, for instance, the ideal of *swadeshi*, which calls for the boycotting of foreign products. This ideal, which resurfaces every so often, is widely believed to have originated with the Indian National Congress and is popularly associated with Gandhi's *charkha* (spinning wheel). In fact, as chapter 5 shows, the ideal emerged before the Congress even existed, and it originated not in romanticism or chauvinism but in anger at British India's unwillingness to protect "infant" domestic industry from foreign competition. Though legitimate, this grievance did not escape criticism from Indians themselves. Even in the nineteenth century we find statesmen pointing out that, the colonial authorities' indifference notwithstanding, there was much that Indians could do to make domestic industry more competitive. The example set by Japan, whose industries had clawed their way into world markets, was never far from their minds. Note, for instance, what Romesh Chunder Dutt had to say in his popular travelogue *Three Years in Europe*. Passing through the recently opened Suez Canal, Dutt observed in 1886:

> Among the steamers that we passed by in the Canal, I will mention one. It was a Japanese Man-of-War, entirely manned and officered by the Japanese. Among all the nations of Asia the Japanese are the only people who are keeping abreast of European civilization; and they are doing so by their energy and honest work, and by their freely adopting whatever is good and great in modern civilization.[29]

Consider another current controversy, namely, whether India ought to enter into alliances. To adopt a policy of this kind, it is sometimes said, would mean shedding a purportedly age-old policy of neutrality. This claim does not hold up to historical scrutiny, however. Chapter 3 shows that when the Great Game in Central Asia intensified, English-educated Indians publicly advocated for Britain and strongly opposed Russia—on ideological grounds. We should not conclude from this, however, that ties of language and culture made Britons and Indians "natural allies." For when Britain greedily pursued hegemony in Asia, and condoned racial discrimination against Indian migrants, the very same English-educated Indians grew disenchanted, creating a rift whose effects still linger. This is a precedent that contemporary observers in the West would do well to reflect upon.

To Raise a Fallen People has immediate relevance in another sense too. It reminds contemporary observers that India has long been home to vigorous debate about ends and means in international politics. As such, it disproves the notion that there is a singular, traditional "Indian" view of the world. Instead, we witness deep disagreement with views ranging from pacific cosmopolitanism to militant nationalism. Notice what this implies. It has become commonplace to depict contemporary India as being in the midst of an intellectual revolution, as an erstwhile saintliness is cast aside in favor of a new, unbecoming muscularity.[30] The essays recovered here cast doubt on this narrative by showing that 'New India,' as it has come to be termed, has deeper foundations than is commonly acknowledged. Muscularity may be more advertised today, but its importance has long been admitted in modern India. Consider, for example, this salutary warning in Bankim Chandra Chatterjee's masterpiece *Dharmatattva* (1888):

> The people who are strong will rob the weaker people. I am not speaking of the barbarians: this is the custom of civilized Europe. Today France is robbing Germany, next day Germany is robbing France. . . . Just as dogs in the rural markets snatch morsels from one another, peoples whether they are civilized or not are despoiling one another's property. A strong people is always ready to fall upon the weaker ones.[31]

ENGLISH EDUCATION

Let us now briefly survey the contents of this volume, proceeding chapter by chapter. The earliest evidence of sustained reflection on the nature of international relations comes from public discussions on the importance of modern education. The zeal with which nineteenth-century Indians sought out such education is well known. But the reasoning behind this collective decision is not nearly as well known. An examination is instructive because it reveals the striking pragmatism of India's metropolitan elite. Having realized how much power and prestige in the modern era depended on knowledge, they explicitly endorsed "European" education in order to raise India's standing. Thus, they flocked to private academies and charitable missionary schools and donated generously to create private institutions like Hindu College in Calcutta and Elphinstone College in Bombay.